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Twentyfive years ago, in 1992, the Seville 
Expo world exhibition took place on the 
subject of “national identity”. The Swiss 
pavilion presented its country in a rather 
controversial and provocative way with 
the slogan “La Suisse n’existe pas” (Swit-
zerland does not exist), created by the art-
ist Ben Vautier. 
Today, the topic is even more relevant 
and up-to-date, probably more so than 
ever before, as voting results show society 
to be deeply divided on many aspects of 
the issue. 
Therefore, the Swiss Academy of Hu-
manities and Social Sciences (SAHSS) 
launched a series of events under the slo-
gan “La Suisse existe – la Suisse n’existe 
pas” – one of them dedicated to “Con-
structing Swiss Identity and Country Im-
age in times of Migration: Integration and 
Exclusion in Europe” on 20.03.2017 at the 
University of Fribourg, which sought to 
reflect on the discursive construction of 
Swiss identity and country image in the re-
current debates about migration and refu-
gees in Switzerland and Europe.
Diana Ingenhoff, full professor and 
vice dean at the University of Fribourg 
who specializes in public diplomacy and 
organizational communication, opened 
the conference and introduced the Swiss 
history on migration discourses and ple-
biscites as well as her research on country 
identity and image. Ruth Wodak, Emer-
ita Distinguished Professor at Lancaster 
University and former full professor at 
University of Vienna, explored the discur-
sive construction of European identities 
and the rise of right-wing populism. Julia 
Metag, associated professor at Universi-
ty of Fribourg who specializes in science 
and political communication, presented 
her research on attitudes towards refugees 
and their relations to media reception. 
Dr. Camelia Beciu, professor at University 
of Bucharest in communication sciences 
and senior researcher at the Institute of 
Sociology, Romanian Academy, presented 
an analysis of the contexts and discours-
es of migration in Europe with respect to 
Romania and Great Britain. Alina Dolea, 
former Fulbright Fellow at University of 
Southern California, associate lecturer at 
University of Bucharest, Romania, con-
nected the construction of the image of 
the other with the self-image, resulting in 
discourses of “sameness” and “difference”. 
Subsequently, Alexander Buhmann, assis-
tant professor at BI Norwegian Business 
School, gave examples of the handling of 
refugees in Norway and Sweden. 
Switzerland’s unique position – geo-
graphically at the heart of Europe, yet his-
torically and culturally independent from 
the European Union – has made it a focal 
point for the immigration debate. The 
“cherry picking debate” (Rosinen picker-
Debatte), alleged foreign infiltration and 
“Dichtestress” (overcrowding stress), pleb-
iscites on banning minarets, or the “Mass 
Immigration Initiative” have not only re-
vealed strong divisions within Switzerland 
but also been closely monitored by inter-
national media. The domestic debates 
are having a clear impact both on the way 
Switzerland is seen abroad and how the 
Swiss see themselves. 
By attempting to grasp what we mean 
when we speak about a country’s identity, 
the difficulties we face become immedi-
ately clear: does a collective entity we call 
Switzerland even exist? A country uniting 
four languages in a small area and shaped 
by the most diverse cultures and climes, 
whose struggle for supremacy between the 
two major Christian belief systems nearly 
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broke it apart, yet which has repeatedly 
put the emphasis on what united the Swiss 
rather than what divided them. How does 
a shared historical conscience emerge, 
how does the media build a common iden-
tity of a “Willensnation” (a nation created 
by the people’s will and consensus) in the 
heart of Europe, and which are the domi-
nant discourses?
As shown by research on the national 
identity, the perceptions about a country – 
whether internal or external – are shaped 
by all kinds of generic attributes including 
functional, ethical-social, aesthetic and af-
fective components. Alongside functional 
aspects such as a country’s economic 
stability, innovation, power and political 
leadership, it is also aesthetic components 
such as the country’s beautiful scenery, as 
well as culture, traditions and charismat-
ic personalities that shape the image of a 
country. The latter often play an important 
role in establishing a national identity, as 
exemplified, for instance, by the persona 
of Roger Federer: he succeeds as no other 
sportsperson has done before in linking 
the story of his success to Swiss attributes 
(or “clichés”) such as modesty and stami-
na, thereby creating a positive image for 
Switzerland and acting as an internation-
al ambassador for an entire country. This 
generates a particular payoff in terms of 
the emotional dimension of the country’s 
image, putting the focus on the friendli-
ness and openness of its inhabitants. These 
impressions are often partly shaped by an 
ethical-social dimension, where a coun-
try’s responsibility towards its citizens and 
the environment, human rights and hu-
manitarianism play a central role. Here 
too, Switzerland can boast a long tradition, 
with Nobel Peace Prize laureates such as 
Henri Dunant achieving international re-
nown and standing, and institutions such 
as the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees being headquartered in Ge-
neva forming part of Switzerland’s image. 
Yet, the question of how to deal with 
refugees and migration is dividing the 
country. The diversity and inner divisions 
both within the Confederation and its 
sovereign cantons is particularly evident 
during the federal plebiscites, which have 
a long tradition of giving voice to fears of 
the consequences of migration and put-
ting the spotlight on the issue of identity 
in various discourses in the media, politics 
and the general population.1
Recently, strongly voiced citizens’ 
fears that refugees and migrants threaten 
the well-being of society (Bauman, 20162) 
have joined the fray. The same author pos-
its “responsibility” as a central issue here, 
describing citizens who feel disconnected 
from the decision-making process and the 
democratic process, and the appropria-
tion of the issue by political parties all over 
Europe.
However, it might be hard to imagine 
how landmark projects for Swiss cultural 
identity would have been possible without 
immigration – think, for example, of the 
construction of the Gotthard and Simplon 
tunnels. Nevertheless, the high number of 
immigrants arriving in the wake of these 
projects brought the issue of “Überfrem-
dung” (“over-foreignization”) to the table 
as early as 1914, when the foreign-born 
proportion of the population stood at up 
to 15 per cent, even reaching over 30 per 
cent in cities such as Geneva and Basel. 
This provided fertile ground for the be-
ginnings of right-wing populism and the 
politicization and xenophobic rhetoric 
of immigration, which saw its first peak 
in the Schwarzenbach Initiative “Against 
Floods of Foreigners and Overpopula-
tion” 3. While in the past the focus was 
on the Jewish people and Bolsheviks, the 
main target in the 1970s was Mediterra-
nean migrant workers, with the initiative’s 
goal to limit the share of foreign residents 
to 10 per cent. On 7 June 1970 the motion 
was rejected, relatively narrowly, with only 
54 per cent, by the men of Switzerland; 
at that time, women did not yet have the 
vote. Characterized as more of an outsid-
er personality, James Schwarzenbach at 
1 Wodak, R. (2015). The politics of fear:Under-
standing the Meanings of Right-wing Popu-
lism. London, UK: Sage.
2 Bauman, Z. (2016). Strangers at our door. 
Cambridge/Malden: Polity.
3 Manatschal, Anita (2015): Switzerland – Re-
ally Europe’s heart of darkness? In: Swiss Po-
litical Science Review 21(1): 23–35.
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the time used a rhetoric that from today’s 
perspective seems grotesque, stigmatizing 
the “brown sons of the South” (usually re-
ferring to Italian immigrants) as “foreign 
plants” and a “creeping disease” threat-
ening direct democracy, Swiss culinary 
habits and labour relations4. Even back 
then xenophobia served “mainly to cover 
up the true reasons behind the situation – 
i.e. a policy providing entrepreneurs with 
immense wealth on the backs of the wor-
kers”5. This also shows that the foreigner 
is always flagged up in terms of creating a 
distinction, a difference “from us”: identity 
construction is framed and becomes man-
ifest in “who we are” and how this “WE” is 
defined by language, linguistic behavior 
and symbols.
Consequently, campaign posters of 
this and other, similar, initiatives and the 
language used by politicians not only 
show how “otherness” is constructed and 
symbolized – but also how national iden-
tity is constructed. These discourses on 
identity can be characterized by applying 
the method of critical discourse analysis to 
1) the notion of a typical representative of 
a nation, 2) the narrative of a shared politi-
cal past, 3) the discursive construction of a 
shared culture, 4) the discursive construc-
tion of a shared present and future, and 
5) the discursive construction of the “na-
tional body”, the state territory (the land-
scape, architecture and cultural heritage) 
(Wodak & Meyer, 20096). 
The Schwarzenbach initiative was fol-
lowed by a number of further initiatives 
against the perceived threat of the foreign, 
with similar content and rhetoric, such as 
the “Initiative for the Restriction of For-
eign Residents”, which aimed to limit the 
number of annual grants of citizenship to 
a maximum of 4,000 and to cap foreign 
4 Maiolino, Angelo (2011): Als die Italiener 
noch Tschinggen waren: der Widerstand 
gegen die Schwarzenbach-Initiative (When 
the Italians where still the Tschinggens: Re-
sistance against the Schwarzbach Initiative). 
Rotpunkt-Verlag. 
5 https://www.woz.ch/-207d (3.6.10)
6 Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M., & Lieb-
hart, K. (2009). The discursive construction of 
national identity. Edinburgh, Scotland: EUP.
residents at 500,000. On 20 Oct 1974 this 
initiative was soundly rejected, with 65 per 
cent of “no” votes. One of the demands of 
the “Limiting Immigration” initiative was 
to allow only 90,000 cross-border com-
muters and to issue no more than 100,000 
annual seasonal permits. This initiative 
was rejected on 4 Dec 1988 with 67 per cent 
of “no” votes. Plebiscites such as the one 
“against the mass immigration of foreign-
ers and asylum seekers” (1991), or “for a 
sensible asylum policy” (1996) failed at the 
early stage of collecting sufficient signa-
tures or were declared void by Parliament. 
Eventually, in the 1990s the SVP (Swiss 
People’s Party) took on the mantle of right-
wing populist initiatives, for instance with 
the initiative “against illegal immigration” 
launched in 1992, which ended up being 
rejected on 1 December 1996 with 54 per 
cent of “no” votes. The initiative “against 
the abuse of the right to asylum” failed 
only very narrowly on 24 Nov 2000 to gain 
a popular majority. 
Then, on 9 February 2014, the first 
“Initiative against Mass Immigration” 
was in fact adopted (albeit with a margin 
of only 19,500 votes, just 50.3 per cent). 
Critical of immigration and demanding a 
restriction of foreigners entering Switzer-
land through annual caps and quotas, it 
ran counter to the bilateral contracts with 
the European Union in terms of freedom 
of movement, and earned major interna-
tional attention. The concept that kept 
cropping up in the debates surrounding 
the mass immigration initiative was the 
so-called “overcrowding stress” (Dichte-
stress), a phenomenon borrowed from 
biology as the central argument of the 
threat of a lower quality of life in the most 
diverse areas – and immediately earned 
the distinction of the Unwort (ugliest, or 
literally, non-word) of the Year. The result 
of the plebiscite reflected once again the 
country’s division along what is known 
as the “Röstigraben”, the dividing line de-
fined by the popular Swiss potato dish. 
In fact, the pattern is similar in nearly all 
the plebiscites that touch on Switzerland’s 
relationship with foreign countries, with 
the supporters of limiting immigration in 
German-speaking Switzerland (with the 
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exception of Zurich, Zug and Basle) and 
in the canton of Ticino, the opponents 
in the French-speaking Romandy part of 
western Switzerland. A stark division be-
tween “yes-voters” and “no-voters” on the 
initiative became apparent, with a heavi-
ly pronounced contrast between city and 
country: the strongest supporters of the 
initiative came from those rural regions 
least affected by pressures on population 
density, with the strongest opponents in 
the densely populated cities. 
One important question arising here is 
how countries strategically project images 
to out-groups (country images) and how 
these images are perceived by in-groups 
(country identity). With international 
media putting a questioning spotlight on 
Switzerland’s model of direct democracy, 
national media gave voice to two differ-
ent types of discourses: 1) the unexpect-
ed vote as a reflection of a deeply divided 
society, marking a change in the repre-
sentation of Swiss identity, 2) while the 
government tried to explain the result of 
the vote mainly in terms of respecting “the 
will of the people” and the consequences 
of direct democracy. Furthermore, media 
grant visibility to the collective actor “the 
Swiss people” and often portray ordinary 
citizens as representative and symbolic of 
a multicultural and diverse Switzerland 
(whether a Geneva resident with Iraqi or-
igins or the children of past immigrants).
The populist discourse works by cre-
ating and exaggerating the differences be-
tween various categories of Swiss (masses 
vs. elites; Italian vs. Romands vs. German 
Swiss; the “yes” voters against the inte-
gration of foreigners vs. the “no” voters 
in favour). Another strategy used is vic-
tim-perpetrator inversion, emphasizing a 
threatened identity and portraying Swit-
zerland as a victim of foreigners/migrants 
and of the EU. To this end, the Swiss Peo-
ple’s Party have started projecting fictitious 
scenarios suggesting the end of the coun-
try and its power to decide its own fate.
Explanations for the result of the vote 
appear to stem from a growing skepticism 
towards immigration, once more firmly on 
the rise since 2012, an identity conflict in 
terms of to what degree Switzerland should 
open itself up to the outside world, and the 
perceived threat of the foreign and a desire 
to hold on to traditions.7 The debates have 
historic precedents, and are by no means a 
purely Swiss phenomenon. Therefore, it is 
important to consider the complex macro 
context, particularly as “often nationalist 
attitudes and ethnic stereotypes artic-
ulated in discourse accompany or even 
determine political decision-making, and 
we note with concern the increase in dis-
criminatory acts and exclusionary practic-
es conducted in the name of nationalism 
in many parts of Europe” (Wodak et al., 
2009, p. 1). At the same time, anti-immi-
grant and, specifically, anti-Muslim preju-
dice and islamophobia is on the rise both 
in Europe and the United States (Ogan et 
al., 2014).
At European level, parties such as 
France’s Front National (FN), Austria’s 
Freedom Party, the Dutch Party for Free-
dom, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, 
Alternative for Germany) or the United 
Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) en-
joy a strong following and are gaining con-
sistently high voting percentages in their 
national elections. Even in countries his-
torically welcoming of immigration, such 
as the United States and Australia, the 
migration issue has been used to stir up 
fears and to distract from the mistakes of 
home-grown policies. The only thing that 
has changed over time is the countries of 
origin of the “scapegoat” migrants. At the 
centre of the debates constructed by the 
media we find, time and again, a desire to 
hold on to the myth of Swiss traditions and 
traits which don’t really exist in any mea-
surable shape or form. The opportunities 
created by migration and change are rarely 
mentioned, nor are we aware of the histo-
ry, and the obligations to provide protec-
tion in accordance with the Geneva Con-
vention on Refugees signed by nearly 150 
countries worldwide, but this seems much 
more needed nowadays. 
7 Sciarini, P., A. Nai and A. Tresch (2014): 
Analyse de la votation fédérale du 9 février 
2014. Bern/Geneve: gfs.bern et Universite 
de Genève.; Abu-Hayyeh, Reem/Fekete, Liz 
(2014): Swiss referendum: flying the flag for 
nativism. Race & Class, Vol. 56(1): 89–94.
